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Abstract  
During the past two decades in Thailand, non-governmental actors, such as NGOs, 
intellectuals, and people’s organizations, have found widening opportunities to participate 
in policy formation and in the implementation of local development. The government has 
facilitated the formation of civil society forums, in the expectation of influencing local-level 
governance.  The last two national five-year development plans were formulated after 
taking into account the voices of people in the provinces.  Even though they may seem 
petty, some state funds are now transmitted through non-governmental institutions for 
policy implementation at the grassroots level.  These changes have their origin in a 
reformation of rural development administration in early 1980s. This reformation in due 
course led to policies that have allowed the participation of non-governmental actors. 
Meanwhile, rural people have proved their ability to engage in participatory development 
by forming various local organizations, while NGOs have grown to be proficient facilitators 
of local development.  This paper describes the process whereby three leading actors, 
namely the government, local people, and the NGOs, have interacted to bring about a more 
participatory system of local development administration. 
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Bringing Non-governmental Actors into the Policymaking Process: 
The Case of Local Development Policy in Thailand1
 
Shinichi Shigetomi 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the 1960s, the Thai political system was described as a typical bureaucratic polity (Riggs, 
1966) and one in which the government decided on and implemented its policies without 
considering extra-bureaucratic actors (ibid., pp.319-320).  Until the 1980s, it was still rare 
for non-governmental actors to participate directly in decision-making and in the 
implementation of national administration, even though these actors were able to wield 
political influence as outsiders, for example through elections and street demonstrations 
(Prudhisan, 1992).  The same system of governance was applied to the field of rural and 
local development. 
It was after the 1990s that changes began to appear.  Nowadays, we can observe some 
mechanisms through which non-governmental actors, such as non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), civic groups, academics, and grassroots leaders, participate directly 
in local development administration.  Some government funding goes to grassroots 
organizations through non-governmental channels.  Even in official governmental projects, 
some government agencies have been bringing non-governmental actors into the planning 
and implementation process. 
This change has its origin in the early 1980s when the government undertook a 
reformation of rural development administration. Even though the reforms began and 
ended within the government sector, they paved the way for further changes in later years. 
Helped by new rural development projects, rural people began to organize themselves at 
the grassroots level.  When effectively organized, people have enjoyed stronger 
opportunities for participating in local development administration.  Some bureaucrats, 
who were in charge of the new rural development planning, persuaded the NGOs to form a 
single national network.  Soon, Thai NGOs became noteworthy actors in participatory 
                                                  
1 This paper was originally presented at the 65th annual conference of the American Society 
for Public Administration at Portland, Oregon in March 27-30, 2004.  Some modifications 
have been made in the preparation of this discussion paper. 
 local development.  Three main actors, namely the government, grassroots organizations, 
and non-governmental facilitators for development, have been the main participants in the 
changes that have occurred since the 1990s.  This paper discusses the ways in which the 
interactions among these three actors have brought about a more participatory system of 
local development administration during the past three decades. 
 
 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN THE 1980s 
 
Under the Thai bureaucratic polity of former years, the voices of non-state actors were 
oppressed by the military dictatorship.  Political parties were banned from 1959 to 1967, 
and the government did not allow freedom of association and expression.  In the early 
1970s, the students challenged this situation.  They demonstrated in mass protests, and 
this stimulated poor farmers and workers to express their demands too.  As a result of a 
clash between the demonstrators and military forces on October 14, 1973, the military 
dictators were exiled from the country.  This event led to the establishment of a 
comparatively democratic system and created an atmosphere in which farmers’ 
organizations were able to actively raise their demands with the government.  However, 
the situation was reversed when the military and the right-wingers strengthened their grip 
again and went on to violently crush a students’ demonstration on October 6, 1976.  Many 
student activists and farmer leaders took refuge in the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) 
and created bases in rural areas.  The government of the extreme right-wing leader 
Thanin Kraivichien exacerbated the political unrest.  Subsequently, military leaders took 
over the government in 1977 and reached a compromise with the dissidents.  This caused 
many activists to leave the CPT and militant anti-government movements until the early 
1980s. 
From the events of the 1970s, the government learned the lesson that rural poverty can be 
a potent cause of political instability.  Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda, who used to be 
the military commander of the northeast region, a strong base of the CPT, put the 
eradication of rural poverty at the top of the agenda of the Fifth National Economic and 
Social Development Plan, which ran from 1982 to 1986. 
At the end of the 1970s, some bureaucrats of the National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB), the planning agency of the government, started thinking 
about reform of the administration of rural development.  With the strong support of 
Prime Minister Prem, they proposed setting up a national committee to coordinate most of 
Thailand’s rural development projects.  This committee was named the National Rural 
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 Development Committee (NRDC) and had the Prime Minister as its chairman.  The 
NESDB had responsibility for the administration of the committee.  It set up a unit called 
the National Rural Development (NRD) Center, and the entire system came to be called the 
NRDC System or Ko Cho Cho in Thai. 
The NRDC System was regarded as an innovation in rural development administration.  
“Coordination” was the key word.  The NRDC supervised and coordinated the rural 
development projects of four related ministries, namely the ministries of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, Public Health, Interior, and Education.  The NRDC System was designed to 
prevent a village having overlapping projects or projects that undermined one another.  
Before the introduction of the NRDC System, each ministry decided on its own projects and 
project sites without consulting the others. 
The NRDC System also aimed to coordinate local people’s demands with the government’s 
policies.  Officials of the four ministries summarized local people’s demands and arranged 
for governmental projects to meet these demands.  Thus, the system involved two types of 
coordination: horizontal (between the related ministries) and vertical (between local and 
national agencies).  However, the government put more emphasis on horizontal 
coordination, at least during the early stages of the NRDC System. 
The actual process worked as follows. The NRDC decided what range of projects to offer in 
which areas and through which agencies.  Local leaders at the village level chose some 
projects from those available.  Local officials then summed up their demands at a 
sub-district level and sent the lists of chosen projects to a district-level coordinating 
committee composed of representatives of the four ministries.  The committee screened 
the lists and sent them to a provincial coordinating committee.  Finally, the provincial 
plans were coordinated by the ministries and the NRDC.   
Since local officials of the four ministries would share information about the projects that 
were implemented in any given village, it was easier to avoid the overlapping of projects.  
Moreover at national level, the NRD Center could take a strong lead in coordinating the 
policymaking process, since the center had the firm backing of the prime minister and also 
had the authority to advise the Budget Bureau about the allocation of funds to projects 
under the NRDC System.   
One weakness of the NRDC System was that participation by local people was limited 
(NESDB, c.1985, p. 195).  Local people were only allowed to “choose” projects from a list 
prepared by the government.  In fact, it was officials rather than local people who 
proposed the projects (NESDB, c.1987, p. 256). 
In spite of this limitation, the NRDC System provided a platform for the future 
development of rural development policy.  First, it provided a center in the government for 
coordinating policymaking for rural and local development.  The NESDB, which 
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 coordinated the entire system, was comparatively free of political maneuvering and its staff 
emphasized social development and distribution rather than macroeconomic growth.  The 
NESDB, especially the section in charge of rural and local development planning, became a 
contact point for extra-bureaucratic agents. 
Second, the NESDB staff recognized the need for popular participation (Pairot, 1985).  As 
a result, they made popular participation an important part of the agenda of the rural 
development plan in the Sixth National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDB, 
1986).   
Third, as a tool for people’s participation, the NRDC in 1984 established the Rural 
Development Fund (RDF) (Wuthiloet, 1998). This initiative came during the first five years 
of the NRDC System.  The NRDC System included some projects which encouraged 
villagers to pool and manage a fund for a specific purpose.  These could be savings groups, 
rice banks, or medicine procurement funds.  Recognizing that these projects bore 
satisfactory results, the secretariat of the NRDC hit upon the idea of providing additional 
funds for villagers (NESDB, c.1984, pp. 22-23; Kitisak & Chaiyong, 1984).  This meant 
that the villagers could use money from the national coffers for projects they designed by 
themselves.  This was fundamentally different from the previous system, in which the 
government decided how projects should be implemented.  Although the performance of 
the RDF was unsatisfactory until the mid-1990s, this fund laid the basis for another 
funding institution, which at present extensively supports popular participation in local 
development. 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS AND NGOs 
 
Self-organizing activities of rural people 
When the government began its reform of rural development administration, an important 
change was under way in rural people’s organizations.  Traditionally, when Thai rural 
people cooperated with each other, they relied on their dyadic and personal relationships 
rather than on formal collective organizations.  For example, a farmer would personally 
ask his relatives, neighbors, and friends to offer free labor when he needed additional labor 
for a certain piece of farm work.  However, from the mid-1970s, a new form of organization 
appeared among villagers who wished to secure economic resources cooperatively.   
The new organizations bound their members with collective consent rather than dyadic 
agreements (Shigetomi, 1998a).  For example, villagers formed a savings group in which 
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 they pooled their money and made loans to members at an interest rate lower than that of 
informal moneylenders.  They agreed the basic conditions, such as the interest rate and 
the terms of repayment, and established them as the group’s collective rules.   
Various similar organizations emerged in the 1970s.  A rice bank pooled villagers’ paddy 
and lent it to members who faced shortages for their own consumption.  Villagers set up a 
cooperative shop by collecting small amounts of money and managing it by themselves.  
These new organizations was mostly disseminated to villagers by government agencies and 
NGOs. In some cases, outside agencies put some funds and materials into villagers’ 
collective management.  For example, the government gave one village some materials for 
making water jars.  The village administration let some villagers use the materials in 
return for money that would revolve within the village for distributing the water jars.  The 
“buffalo bank” project was of a similar kind.  A farmer who received a female buffalo as 
part of this project would keep it for farm use until it had two calves.  The farmer would 
then keep one calf for his or her own use and hand over the mother buffalo and the other 
calf to another villager.  In some cases, the villagers themselves began to use their 
communal resources of their village more effectively and efficiently.  For example, some 
villages began to raise fish in the village communal pond, while others drew up new 
regulations for the conservation and local collection of nearby forest resources including 
fuels and foods.   
In the 1980s, there was a visible increase in the variety and number of organizations that 
local people managed for their mutual economic assistance. The number of savings groups, 
for example, increased from 1,345 in 1980 to 9,099 in 1990 (CDD, 1997).  In 1990, 22% of 
villages had a rice bank, 11% had a buffalo bank, 50% had a drug fund, and 15% had a 
savings group2. 
Some examples showed that such local organizations could bring a tangible improvement 
to a village’s economy.  For example, one savings group in the southern province pooled 
more than four million baht and lent members enough money to purchase a rubber 
plantation (Shigetomi, 1998b).  Although most groups were much smaller than this, they 
helped villagers to secure funds and materials at lower costs than would have been possible 
otherwise.   
The success of these organizational activities has had three important effects.  First, it has 
revealed the organizational capabilities of local people.  Some NGO leaders and academics 
have asserted that rural communities in Thailand contain social mechanisms that explain 
people’s success in organizing themselves. The success of these projects in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms has lent validity to such assertions.   
                                                  
2 According to data collected from all villages in the National Rural Development Survey 
(Ko Cho Cho. 2 Kho.).   
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 Second, organizational activities have made some local leaders known outside their villages, 
since some successful cases have been publicized along with the names of the leaders.  
Some leaders had not assumed any formal position in local administrative units, and prior 
to their involvement in organizational activities, their leadership was known about only in 
the localities concerned. 
Third, local success has attracted the attention of the government.  In the mid-1970s, 
CDD was the sole agent for forming groups such as savings groups, rice banks, and village 
shops.  Subsequently, other governmental agencies initiated similar programs.  For 
example, the Department of Internal Trade and the Accelerated Rural Development Office 
promoted village stores, while the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives persuaded 
farmers to establish collective paddy storage facilities similar to rice banks.  The buffalo 
bank was promoted by the Department of Livestock.  Funding for the setting up of public 
health facilities, including the provision of medicines, water jars, tanks, and toilets, was 
provided by the Ministry of Public Health and by the CDD.  The fish-raising project in 
village communal ponds was launched by the Department of Fishery.  The Rural 
Development Fund (RDF) of the NESDB also emerged out of this trend.  These various 
projects mostly got under way in the early 1980s as an outcome of the NRDC System3.  
Later, in the 1990s, the government established some institutions specializing in funding 
activities such as these.   
 
Development of the NGO sector 
In Thailand, organized philanthropic activities of a private sector kind can be traced back 
to before the Second World War.  However, it was not until the 1960s that voluntary 
organizations for assisting underprivileged people began to emerge and to offer an 
alternative means of development.  In the rural development sector, the first organization 
to appear was the TRRM (Foundation of Thailand Rural Reconstruction Movement under 
the Royal Patronage of H.M. the King), an institution that was established in 1967.  The 
establishment of the TRRM was initiated by Puey Ungpakorn, who was the then director of 
the Central Bank of Thailand.  Most of the founding members and executives were 
high-ranking government officials and well-known business leaders.  The field workers 
were recruited from among low-ranking government officials.  However, soon after TRRM 
started to implement projects in the field, its workers developed an identity as 
non-government actors and adopted a critical perspective towards government policies.   
During the period without military dictatorship, between 1974 and 1976, at least 15 NGOs 
                                                  
3 The buffalo bank of the Livestock Department, the drug fund, and the village fishery 
project all started in 1982.  However, some of them had pilot programs or other programs 
that were implemented by other agencies.   
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 emerged in the field of rural development in Thailand (TVS, 1986).  All of these NGOs 
ceased their activities after the military coup of October 1976.  However, when the 
government eased its oppressive strategy towards dissidents, most NGOs resumed their 
activities and new NGOs emerged in this field.  There were at least 87 NGOs in the rural 
development field in 1986 (ibid.).   
Most NGOs worked without any coordination or cooperation with each other.  The field 
workers, however, had some personal contact with each other.  From 1978, they started 
holding annual meetings to exchange their experiences (EFORD, 1985).   
When the NRD Center recognized the lack of popular participation in the administration of 
rural development, it thought that NGOs might be able to make a useful contribution.  
The bureaucrats of the NESDB, especially those working in the rural development section, 
had a positive view of NGO activists.  Puey Ungpakon, the founder of the TRRM, used to 
be an executive of the NESDB.  Pairot Suchinda, who had been the secretary general of 
the NRD Center from 1981 to 1992, used to observe the activities of the TRRM.   
In 1984, the NRDC established a working group to bridge the gap between the government 
and the NGO sector (Khana tham ngan, 1986).  Sumet Tantiwechakul, who assumed the 
post of NRD Center chief from May 1984, became the head of this working group. The 
NESDB needed a national center of NGOs in order to mobilize NGOs for more successful 
rural development.  Before starting to cooperate with NGOs, the NESDB persuaded 
NGOs to form an organization for mutual coordination.  In 1985, the NGOs held 
regional-level seminars, which NESDB staff also attended, and chose their representatives 
for a national conference.  In December 1985, these representatives and the NRD Center 
co-hosted a national conference with 106 NGOs as participants and established the NGO 
Coordinating Committee on Rural Development (NGO-CORD) (ibid.)4.   
The main characteristics of NGO-CORD as a national center have been as follows.  First, 
NGO-CORD brought together NGOs from fields other than rural development. The list of 
those who attended the founding conference contained diverse groups whose concerns 
covered public health, women, children, human rights and religion.  Hence, NGO-CORD 
developed as a national center that accommodated NGOs in every field of activity.   
Second, even though NGO-CORD was established with the support of the NESDB, a 
government agency, it developed independently of the government and government policies.  
NGO-CORD has never been a tame partner of the NESDB or of any other government 
agencies and has been unwilling merely to supplement the work of the government 
agencies.  The notion of the NRD Center bringing NGOs into the NRDC System has never 
been realized.   
                                                  
4 An NGO directory in 1986 listed 142 organizations (TVS, 1986); this means that 
three-quarters of the NGOs participated in the conference to establish NGO-CORD. 
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 Third, NGO-CORD has been a sort of network of NGOs rather than an organization that 
has exerted a strong grip over its constituent members.  It held national assemblies once 
in two years.  The attendance rate was not high; about half the members in Bangkok 
attended, corresponding to about one-fifth of the national membership5.  Decisions were 
made by a small number of active organizations or leaders.  However, its wide network 
has given NGO-CORD sufficient authority to represent the NGO sector in Thailand. 
The number of NGOs listed in the various directories in Thailand increased from about 140 
in 1986 to 370 in 1990, 460 in 1997, and 570 in 2003 (CUSRI, CMUSRI & KKURDI, 1990; 
Anusorn & Supapan, 1997; Anusorn 2003).  The field of their activities expanded too.  
NGO-CORD set up sector-wide sub-organizations that functioned as networks of NGOs in 
the same field.  NGOs by themselves formed various networks of organizations working 
on the same theme.  Themes included women, slum problems, the environment, 
alternative agriculture, hill tribes, and public health issues (Benchamat & Suraphon, 2002).  
In 1994, NGO-CORD erased the word “Rural” from its name and became NGO-COD (NGO 
Coordinating Committee on Development). 
Some organizations connected foreign donors with domestic NGOs that were not able to 
secure funds by themselves (Amara, c.1998).  Among them, the LDAP (Local Development 
Assistance Program) was quite important.  This program was funded by the Canadian 
government’s Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and supervised by the 
Thai government’s Ministry of Interior and Department of Technical and Economic 
Cooperation (DTEC).  Among the members of the program’s executive committee were 
NGO leaders and academics who were close to NGOs.  From 1984, the program started 
funding NGOs.  The project proposals were screened by a project reviewing committee 
consisting of CIDA, DTEC, the NGOs, and academic institutions.   
The inauguration of this program marked a new era, since the program’s funds were larger 
than those of past mechanisms for funding Thai NGOs.  Under the program, a sum of 85.3 
million baht was granted to 55 rural and urban development projects6 (Pimjai, 2001).  The 
program’s money made LDAP a center of networking among local and small NGOs.   
In 1991, LDAP became the Local Development Foundation (LDF), with an agency for 
implementation, known as the Local Development Institution (LDI).  The representative 
of the LDF was Prawes Wasi, a medical doctor who had received the Magsaysay Award7 
and who had worked to disseminate the idea of participatory public health.  He had 
received a King’s scholarship when he studied abroad and often expressed royalist ideas.  
                                                  
5 Calculated from the record of the 1997 national assembly of NGO-COD (Anuson, 1998). 
6 Of the 92 NGOs that disclosed their annual budget in the years around 1986, 85 percent 
had annual budgets of less than 10 million baht (calculated from TVS, 1986).  
7 This is a prestigious award for individuals and organizations in Asia who have achieved 
distinction in their respective fields and who have helped others. 
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 He was a government official (a medical doctor at a government hospital), an NGO leader, 
and a person who claimed to have a close relationship with the King.  Such personal 
attributes gave him considerable scarcity value.  Indeed, he was unusually well qualified 
for a post that steered governmental funds towards the NGOs.   
Another notable institution was the Urban Community Development Office (UCDO) which 
came under the administration of a governmental agency known as the National Housing 
Authority.  Following an organizational struggle among the slum dwellers, the 
government established a fund of 250 million baht and set up UCDO as a managing agency 
(Praphat, 2000).  The scheme was designed to assist people’s organizations rather than 
the NGOs.  However, the NGOs saw the fund as an important resource for supporting 
their target groups.   
The first managing director of UCDO, Paiboon Wattanasiritham, worked in the Central 
Bank of Thailand when Puey Ungpakorn was its director.  After occupying some 
important positions in the monetary and financing sector, he became the director of TRRM 
in 1988.  He was highly qualified in fund management and, at the same time, in acting as 
an intermediary between the government and the NGO sector.   
 
 
IMPACT OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EVENTS OF THE 1990s 
 
In the 1990s, several important events changed the environment of governance in Thailand.  
These included a series of developments, following the military coup of 1991, that 
culminated in the promulgation of a new constitution and the establishment of related 
institutions at the end of the 1990s.  Another important event was the economic crisis that 
abruptly broke out in 1997.   
 
Political reform 
In February 1991, the military leaders toppled Chartchai Chunhawan’s government and 
set up the National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC) to control the government.  The NPKC 
nominated Anand Panyarachun, a progressive businessman and ex-bureaucrat, as Prime 
Minister.  In the general election of March 1992, Prime Minister Anand established a 
poll-watching volunteer organization.  He invited Gothom Ariya, an academic who had 
been a leader of the human rights and democratization movements since the 1970s, to 
oversee this organization.  The organization brought together more than 30,000 
volunteers.  Students made up the largest portion of this total (45%).  People from the 
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 state sector also played an important role.  They accounted for 18% of the total number of 
volunteers, while NGO workers made up less than 1% (Ongkon Klang, 1992, p. 172).   
In the election, pro-NPKC political parties formed a majority and elected Suchinda 
Prakrayoon, the Army Commander in Chief and the leader of NPKC, as Prime Minister.  
This betrayed the hopes of the public, who had looked forward to non-military leaders in 
government.  Some NGOs and the opposition parties started to campaign against 
Suchinda.  From the end of April, huge crowds gathered to call for the resignation of the 
Prime Minister.  Matters came to a head with clashes between the protestors and 
government forces between May 17 and May 21.  Suchinda stepped down and Anand 
assumed office for a second time.   
In preparation for the coming general election in September 1992, Anand set up a 
poll-watching organization and had Gotom supervise it again.  This time, the number of 
volunteers surged to more than 60,000 (Pollwatch, 1994). Half of the volunteers who 
worked as coordinators were government officials and employees (Table 1).   
As a result of the general election, the former opposition parties came together to form the 
government.  The amendment of the constitution to make it more democratic became an 
important political topic.  Some intellectuals succeeded in drawing public concern to this 
issue.  Prawes Wasi chaired a governmentally installed committee for political reform and 
opened up the way for the amendment of the constitution by non-state actors.  At last, a 
constitution-drafting assembly was set up, its members being elected partly from the 
general public and partly from law specialists and political scientists.  Some NGOs 
worked hard to put their ideas into the draft (Shigetomi, 2004).  The assembly held public 
hearings about the draft in every province, a development that brought many local people 
together to talk about politics and governance. 
Table 1: Distribution of Pollwatch Volunteers, by Occupation, for the General Election, September 1992
Person %
Farmers 140 9.7
Teachers, lecturers, and researchers 183 12.7
Lawyers, medical doctors and other medical workers 152 10.5
Business people and entrepreneurs 75 5.2
Workers 44 3.0
Government officials (excluding teachers) and state agency employees 709 49.1
Students 52 3.6
NGO workers and development volunteers 13 0.9
Others 76 5.3
Total 1,444 100.0
Source）Pollwatch, Thamniap phu prasan ngan asasamak (po o so.) . (The voluntary coordinator
list), Bangkok: Pollwatch, December 1992.  
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Encapsulating as it did a philosophy of political reform, the 1997 constitution gave more 
weight and power to the non-state sector and restricted the power of the state sector’s 
bureaucrats and politicians.  The Upper House was reformed and became a watchdog of 
the Lower House.  Many measures were put in place to prevent vote-buying by politicians.  
Independent bodies were set up to detect any corruption or misuse of authority by 
bureaucrats or politicians. 
 
Economic crisis 
In July 1997, the Thai government announced that it would float the exchange rate of its 
currency with the dollar.  Immediately, the baht’s market exchange rate fell by more than 
half.  Many enterprises that relied on foreign loans became unable to repay them, and 
bankruptcies, construction stoppages, and layoffs hit the Thai people.  People were told 
that the reason for the crisis was the “bubble economy” brought about by excessively rapid 
growth, too much unproductive investment, and over-reliance on the world economy.   
In the midst of this turmoil, the performance of the rural sector looked better than that of 
other sectors.  Many agricultural commodities were export-oriented and domestically 
value-added products.  The drop of the baht meant higher prices for exports, while 
production needed few imported goods.  Many of those who lost their jobs relied on their 
home villages for temporary relief.  The King, in his annual birthday speech, emphasized 
the need for a sense of contentment in the economy.   
In this social context, the strengthening of the rural economy was regarded as a means of 
stabilizing the national economy.  The concept of community was now more than a matter 
of rural development.  It was generalized into a notion of mutual help, beneficial 
association of any kind, and even an amicable atmosphere.  Prawes Wasi described the 
community as the basis of health, happiness, democracy, and development (Prawes, 1994).  
In this context, the word “community” took on stronger legitimacy after the crisis. 
Another important consequence of the economic crisis was the introduction of the Social 
Investment Fund (SIF).  As part of its efforts to ease the deficit of dollar reserves, the Thai 
government took out loans totaling 482 million dollars from the World Bank and other 
institutions (Chaturong, 2000).  Of these, 120 million dollars from the World Bank were 
earmarked for the SIF to strengthen the social safety net.  The SIF was designed to be 
managed by the non-governmental sector and to be distributed to numerous groups of local 
people across the nation.  We shall discuss the impact of SIF in more detail later. 
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ATTEMPTS AT PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE IN LOCAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Participation of non-governmental actors in national development plan 
Even though NGO-CORD was established with the support of the NESDB, there was little 
collaboration in rural development and economic planning between the NESDB and the 
NGOs until the mid-1990s.  The concept paper for the rural development plan of the Sixth 
Five-Year National Development Plan (1987-91) described the participation of local people 
and NGOs as an important strategy (NESDB, 1986).  However, there was no NGO activist 
on the committee that was to draw up the plan.  For the Seventh Five-Year National 
Development Plan (1992-96), NGO-CORD took a seat on a sub-committee for drawing up 
the rural development plan (NESDB, 1989).  However, the basic form of the plan was 
decided by the NESDB and the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), a 
non-profit research institute.  When the NESDB invited about 80 people to a public 
hearing about the plan, it transpired that only four were from the NGO sector.   
A drastic change occurred during the process of drafting the eighth plan (1997-2001).  In 
1994, Sumet Tantiwechakul, then the director general of the NESDB, invited Paiboon 
Wattanasiritham, then NGO-CORD representative, to the National Committee on 
Decentralization Policy for Provincial and Local Development (NCDP) and listened to his 
ideas about how the plan should be drafted.  The NCDP was the NRDC’s successor.  It 
dealt not only with rural development, but also with all other issues relating to provincial 
development.  For purposes of designing the eighth plan, Paiboon proposed a hearing of 
social thinkers rather than economists.  Sumet adopted this idea and held a 
brain-storming meeting of about 40 prominent social thinkers early in 1995 (NESDB, 1995).  
Then, the NESDB asked NGO-CORD to organize a regional-level public hearing relating to 
the plan.  As mentioned before, NGO-CORD had already enlarged its network to include 
more than 400 members, and had also created a sector-wide network as its 
sub-organization.  It was not difficult for the NGOs to bring some local leaders from 
various fields to the public hearing.  After the nine regional-level meetings, the NESDB 
held a national conference which attracted more than 1,200 participants.  The 
participants were divided into small groups of 10 people, and their discussions were 
recorded by NESDB staff.  All these procedures were designed under the leadership of 
Paiboon. 
The eighth plan was quite different from its predecessors.  It made human development 
its main target rather than material or economic development.  Rather than proposing an 
economic strategy for development, it put forward a desirable image of society.  It 
therefore attracted the criticism that it failed to offer concrete targets and strategies. 
12 
 This unique feature of the eighth plan might have stemmed from several factors.  First, 
Sumet was a political scientist by training and a person who worked for grassroots 
development rather than macroeconomic growth.  The public hearing, involving as it did 
broader sectors of society, fed a variety of views into the plan.  As a result, the plan took on 
an abstract character that no doubt reflected its attempt to satisfy everyone.  Moreover 
the opinions of the NGOs led to the plan being more socially oriented and less concerned 
with economic growth.  Since the plan was designed when Thailand was experiencing a 
high rate of economic growth in the late 1980s, there was a feeling among the participants 
that the nation should solve its social problems rather than develop its economy further.   
Preparations were more extensive for the public hearing for the ninth plan (2002-2006).  
This time, however, the NESDB asked the Local Development Institute (LDI) to organize 
the province-level meetings.  The LDI cooperated with SIF’s office and used the networks 
of both institutions to hold 100 meetings in all 76 provinces during 2000 (NESDB, 2000).  
NGO-COD was unhappy with this development since its role had been taken over by the 
LDI.   
 
Funds for people’s organizations and network formation 
We have already seen that the government established two funds that were designated for 
the organizational activities of local people.  One was the Rural Development Fund (RDF), 
while the other was the Urban Community Development Fund (UCDO). 
As has already been explained, the RDF was established by the NESDB as a part of the 
NRDC System and supervised by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) until 1991.  The fund 
was not fully used because of the excessively strict conditions set by the government on its 
use.  People were required to deposit 30% of the loan amount at state banks and have the 
district chief as the underwriter of the loan (Wuthiloet, 1998).  After the NESDB took over 
the management of the fund in 1992, the amount of loans began to increase.  However, the 
NESDB did not have local offices to spread the fund more widely throughout the country.  
Then, from 1994, the fund was transferred to the Government Savings Bank (GSB).  Since 
the GSB had local branches throughout the nation, it was hoped that local people would 
have easier access to the fund.  The number of organizations that received loans jumped 
from about 30 per year during the period under the PMO and the NESDB to 166 in the first 
year under the GSB8.   
In the public hearings for the Eighth National Development Plan, there was a proposal to 
                                                  
8 The internal data of GSB obtained in 1998.  The number increased to 763 in 1996 and 
622 in 1997.  The main borrowers were savings groups (50% of all kinds of groups in 
around 1998). 
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 establish a national finance institution to support local organizations (Kong prasan ngan 
phatthana chonnabot, 1997).  One year before the economic crisis, the NCDP decided to 
establish the Community Organization Development Institution (CODI) by combining the 
RDF and the UCDO.  This intention, however, was realized only after the economic crisis.  
The Finance Minister, Tarrin Nimmanahemin, who struggled to revive the economy from 
the crisis, pushed the proposal to his cabinet colleagues.   
Before the CODI was set up, Thailand had received aid through the Social Investment 
Fund (SIF).  Since this fund was a rescue program for economic crisis, Finance Minister 
Tarrin took responsibility for project management design.  He consulted some 
intellectuals, including Paiboon Wattanasiritham, who was the managing director of 
UCDO.  Paiboon led the discussion about how to use the fund coming from the World 
Bank.  In the end, the government ordered the Government Savings Bank (GSB) to 
manage the fund and later assigned Paiboon Wattanasiritham as the Director General of 
the GSB.  The government chose the GSB because it had experience of managing the RDF 
(Paiboon, c.1998).  Paiboon was named because he was a key person who designed the 
project9.  Paiboon proceeded to hire Anek Nakabutr, an NGO activist who had formerly 
served as the LDAP coordinator and the LDI director, as the manager of SIF’s office 
(SOFO). 
The SIF program was different from past funds.  First of all, the size of fund was 
enormous; at 120 million dollars, it was equivalent to about 4,700 million baht.  It was 
more than 50 times larger than LDAP’s grant for development projects, 15 times larger 
than the RDF that was transferred GSB, and four times the UCDO’s fund10.  Second, the 
fund had to be swiftly distributed since the World Bank had set the project period at 40 
months and the purpose of the fund was to alleviate the impact of the economic crisis at the 
grassroots level.  Third, the fund had to be distributed to every part of the country.  The 
impact of the economic crisis was so extensive that the program needed to be disseminated 
throughout the whole country. 
From the outset, the SOFO encountered several management difficulties.  The World 
Bank required a high level of transparency and set strict conditions for releasing the funds 
to local organizations (Anida, 2002).  In the beginning, most project applications were 
turned down because they did not satisfy the conditions.  At the same time, local people, 
who were not used to writing project proposals, received little assistance in drawing up the 
applications.  This was partly because the NGOs, which had been working to assist 
people’s organizational efforts, severely criticized the policy of accepting the loan from the 
World Bank and were not willing to support the program.  In its report, the SOFO 
                                                  
9 Interview with Paiboon Wattanasiritham in September 1998. 
10 NESDB transferred 311 million baht to GSB in 1995 for RDF (Wuthiloet, 1998).  The 
UCDO’s fund amounted to 1250 million baht (Praphat, 2000). 
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 described the NGOs as an “obstacle” (ibid., p. 22).  For its part, the SOFO was criticized by 
local people for being too rigid and by the World Bank for being slow to disseminate the 
funds.   
 
Person %
60 4.8
196 15.8
Farmers 15 1.2
597 48.0
Community Development Department (CDD) 106 8.5
Other offices of the Interior Ministry (MOI) 46 3.7
Education (MOE) 40 3.2
Public Health (MOPH) 78 6.3
Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC) 84 6.8
Public Relations Department (PRD) 24 1.9
Police (NPO) 6 0.5
Local government (TAO, thesaban, PAO) 35 2.8
Labour and Public Welfare (MOLPW) 22 1.8
Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) 40 3.2
Government Savings Bank (GSB) 99 8.0
Others, category unknown 17 1.4
114 9.2
26 2.1
116 9.3
5 0.4
80 6.4
Lawyers 8 0.6
Politicians 1 0.1
25 2.0
TOTAL 1,243 100.0
Business, media
Civic groups, NGOs, community organizations
Government officials
Table 2: Distribution of SIF's Provincial Committee Members by Vocation or Organizational
              Affiliation
Note (1) Total number of committee members in the original data is 1,442, of which
199 are without data on vocation and/or affiliation.
    (2) The date of recording the original data is not specified. It is likely to be later
than September 1999 since the affiliating organizations of some members were
established after September 1999.
Local people
Categrory unknown
Source) Social Development Fund Office
Teachers, lecturers
Abbots and priests
Offically assigned volunteers
Retired governemnt officers
 
 
The solution was to set up regional and provincial committees which could closely support 
and adequately screen the proposals coming forward from local people.  Government 
officials and governmentally assigned volunteers became an important human resource 
once the fund decentralized its management.  As shown in Table 2, 48 percent of 
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 provincial committee members are government officials (excluding teachers) and state 
enterprise employees. Among the government agencies, the Community Development 
Department of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 
and the Ministry of Public Health all played important roles. These agencies have direct 
contact through their field-level officers with local leaders and volunteers in every village of 
the entire nation.  When the SIF needed to expand its coverage within a limited time 
frame, the extensive networks of governmental agencies turned out to be highly useful 
(ibid., 22).   
These governmental networks, however, were mobilized through personal contacts rather 
than through top-down hierarchical orders of the bureaucracy.  When the staff of SOFO 
personally contacted a government officer or a governmentally assigned volunteer, the 
latter would be local-level organizers.  The governmental network would then be used to 
find someone who would volunteer for the project.  The government agencies might 
promote or facilitate “personal” or “voluntary” activities of this kind.   
Since the network expanded through personal contacts, the fund office was able to find 
people from various sectors of society.  For example, in Surin Province, people who worked 
for NGO projects were involved in this program through personal contacts with the staff of 
SOFO.  In this way, the regional and provincial representatives were quite diverse: they 
included university lecturers, lawyers, government officials, leaders of community 
organizations, and NGO workers. 
By the end of the project period (January 2003), SIF money had been distributed in respect 
of about 7,000 organizational activities (SOFO, c.2003).  This number was about one-tenth 
of the total number of villages in Thailand.  When the fund was distributed, regular 
contacts emerged between the provincial-level committees and local organizations.  Some 
provincial committees hired personnel to coordinate fund allocation and management.  
Such full-time staff facilitated more regular and stable contacts among the individuals and 
organizations in the networks.   
The CODI (Community Organization Development Institution) began to operate fully in 
late 2001.  With the establishment of CODI, the financial support for people’s 
organizations became more institutionalized.  The CODI was an independent agency with 
about 20 permanent staff and a state budget (CODI, 2002).  It succeeded in securing about 
2,850 million baht from UCDO, RDF, and other organizations, while the government 
provided 270 million baht for project implementation.  Some of the fund was distributed to 
the provincial level coordinators.  Loei Province, one of the provinces with a strong 
coordinating organization, hired full-time staff with the money from CODI11.  The CODI 
claims to include 21,273 local organizations in its network (CODI, 2001, p. 21). 
                                                  
11 Interview with some local leaders in February 2004. 
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Formation of civil society forums 
In the process of drafting the Eighth National Development Plan, Prawes Wasi chaired a 
sub-committee on the rural development part of the plan.  This committee continued to 
meet even after the start of the eighth plan and proposed the idea of a provincial civil 
society forum, or Prachakhom Changwat as it is called in Thai.  While the eighth plan 
gives only an abstract description of popular participation, the committee expected the 
forum to be a mechanism for ensuring actual participation.   
The rural development section of the NESDB, which had been taking care of the NRDC 
and later the NCDP, became the secretariat responsible for designing the forum.  
According to the concept paper prepared by the NESDB, the forum was to be a loose 
network or a circle gathering people together from various parts of society within a 
province (NESDB, 1996).  The forum was meant to emerge as a natural consequence of 
informal exchanges among various people in the governmental and non-governmental 
sectors.  It was envisaged that the core might be made up of academics from tertiary 
education institutes, NGOs, or other volunteers.  The forum was expected to present ideas 
on local development to the government agencies at a provincial level. 
The forum had to be a voluntary organization; it could not be formed by a governmental 
bureaucracy or by orders of the state.  That being the case, how could the NESDB, a 
governmental agency, promote the formation of the forum?  The NESDB asked an 
academic institution to draw up model scenarios in four provinces in which it was possible 
to find a coordinating organization or individual.  After recognizing the validity of the 
models, the government, in 1998, decided to set up a forum in every province.   
However, according to the terms of reference of these forums, the government could not be 
act as the agent responsible for their foundation.  Therefore, the government transferred 
the task to an NGO, the Local Development Institute (LDI).  The LDI had already 
developed its own network through distributing funds to local NGOs.  Prawes Wasi 
recruited Poldej Pinprateep, a medical doctor, as its new director in 1998.  In the same 
year, the funding program of the Canadian government came to an end; however, the LDI 
could continue to secure financial resources by accepting projects from the government.  
For example, it received 40 million baht from the government for disseminating provincial 
forums12.   
Now, the LDI did not have to rely solely on its own funds and networks.  SIF had already 
begun its work, and had developed its nationwide network of local leaders and people’s 
organizations.  Soon after, CODI was established for a similar purpose.  Since the leaders 
                                                  
12 Interviews at LDI (January 2004) and NESDB (September 1999). 
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 of LDI, SIF, and CODI shared similar ideas and were sometimes the same people, it was 
easy to ensure cooperation among these organizations.  In 2001, the government 
established another huge fund called the Thai Health Promotion Foundation (ThaiHealth) 
obtained through transferring two percent of the revenue from liquor and cigarette taxes.  
This fund was also used for strengthening civil society. 
With the support of these national-level institutions, some forums tried to influence 
provincial and local governance.  For example, the forum of Roi-et Province suggested to 
the police effective traffic control measures for the prevention of road accidents.  They held 
a seminar on this issue and invited the police chief and the district chief to attend, their 
intention being to use the opportunity of the forum to communicate their ideas directly to 
the government.  The dominant members of the forum in this province were officials of the 
Ministry of Public Health, since Red Cross people been the pioneer core members and had 
persuaded people to join through their personal networks. 
The forum of Surin Province was based on a network of local NGOs.  The leaders were 
NGO activists, government officials, lawyers, teachers, and local leaders.  They raised 
various issues, including political ones.  The forum had a full-time coordinator whose 
salary was paid from governmental funds including SIF money.  The forum invited the 
provincial governor to a conference to discuss the province’s development plan.  Some 
members of the forum became advisors to the governor. 
The forum of Chaiyaphum Province plans to promote organic farming through its network.  
The leading members are local school teachers who have been assisting community 
development activities.  The SIF program officials visited people’s organizations in their 
localities, and in this particular case, the officials found a teacher who was working closely 
with the people.  This teacher subsequently became the core member of the forum. 
In Uthai Thani, a public health official is a key figure coordinating the forum.  She is 
allowed to allocate some of her time to the forum, since the LDI officially asked for the 
cooperation of the government.  The central office of the forum employs four full-time staff 
whose salaries are paid by funds from the LDI and ThaiHealth.  The forum has held an 
open meeting with local government about environmental issues and the rural economy. 
As can be seen from the above cases, the provincial forums remain unofficial agents in the 
formal governance system.  Some of them can influence provincial governance through 
social mechanisms, for example through raising issues in public, and through exploiting 
opportunities to exchange ideas with the government.  In cases where high-ranking 
government officials in the provincial administration are sympathetic to such movements, 
the forums may enjoy a stronger connection with government agencies.  Even in such 
cases, however, the connection relies on personal contacts rather than on institutional 
mechanisms. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In Thailand, opportunities for non-governmental actors to participate in the process of 
governance have been increasing over the past two decades.  When the NESDB designed 
the NRDC System and tried to alter the governance system as regards rural development 
policymaking and implementation in the 1980s, the main target was coordination between 
governmental agencies.  Opportunities for local people’s participation, even though they 
were greater than before, were nevertheless limited, and took the form of choosing from a 
list of projects provided by the government.  The scope of reform did not take 
non-governmental actors into account as agents of governance.   
However, the system, staff, and ideas that were developed in this reform brought some 
important changes after the 1990s.  Firstly, NGOs and other non-governmental actors 
have had opportunities to express their views in the process of planning national social and 
economic policy.  Those who introduced this new practice were the NESDB bureaucrats 
who worked for the NRDC System in the 1980s.  These bureaucrats called on NGOs to 
form a national network in the mid-1980s.  Second, in the policy formation process, 
non-governmental actors have sought opportunities to express their ideas at provincial 
level.  This idea was proposed and enriched by the people who succeeded in utilizing the 
administrative framework of the NRDC System.  Third, in policy implementation, local 
people have been able to gain access to funds that have been available for implementing 
their own projects.  This principle was first proposed and implemented in the NRDC 
System.   
These developments were made possible by changes in the Thai political and economic 
environment during the 1990s.  The political reforms that followed the May 1992 Event 
created institutions and an environment that promoted popular participation.  The 
economic crisis of 1997 also generated conditions that strengthened local communities.  
Such external impacts have to some extent legitimized the participation of 
non-governmental actors in governance. 
The capabilities of the various actors have also been important in this transformation.  
First, the human and material resources of the government were indispensable in 
expanding the opportunities for participation by non-governmental actors.  Since the 
government’s network was naturally the most extensive, it proved especially useful when 
the participatory system of non-governmental actors expanded its area of coverage.  Many 
government officials joined the SIF committees as private individuals.  They also joined 
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 the civil society forums at provincial level.  Since the government could provide much 
funding, non-governmental actors were able to expand their networks extensively.  The 
funding also made the networks, which relied on personal relationships at first, more 
stable and institutionalized. 
Second, the local people themselves have created the conditions in which the 
extra-bureaucratic network has been able to penetrate to the grassroots.  As a result of 
active promotion by governmental and non-governmental organizations since the 
mid-1970s, there are now many people’s organizations that are active in local communities.  
This has allowed external agents, governmental and non-governmental, access to local 
leaders without having to rely on the official local administrative structure.   
Third, NGOs have provided some important ideas for this system of participatory 
governance.  It was the NGOs that started creating networks involving themselves and 
local organizations.  NGOs also discovered the capability of local people to organize 
themselves.  NGOs were advocates of popular participation in the development process.  
However, when the government started to change its system of governance, as discussed 
above, the mainstream NGOs were sidelined from the process.  Their networks and 
resources were not as extensive as those of the government.  Only NGOs or NGO activists 
who were willing to collaborate with the government entered the mainstream and 
benefited from the changes that have been discussed in this report. 
 
 
References 
 
Anida Winitchakun (ed.) (2002). Lem 1 phatthana kan kong thun phua kan long thun 
thang sangkhom. [Book 1 of Development of Social Investment Fund], Bangkok: Social 
Investment Fund Office. 
Anuson Chaiyaphan (ed.) (1998). Liao lang lae na ongkon phatthana ekachon: Bot sen 
thang ngan phatthana, Noeng thosawat Ko Po. O Pho Cho. [Looking back and forth of 
NGOs: Ten years of NGO-COD], Bangkok: NGO-COD. 
--------------- (eds.) (2003). Thamniap ongkon phatthana ekachon 2546. [2003 directory of 
non-governmental organizations], Bangkok: Khana kammakan phoi phrae lae songsoem 
ngan phattahana. 
Anuson Chaiyaphan and Suphaphan Phalangsak (eds.) (1997). Thamniap ongkon 
phatthana ekachon 2540. [1997 directory of non-governmental organizations], Bangkok: 
Khana kammakan phoi phrae lae songsoem ngan phattahana & Munnithi withet 
pahtthana. 
20 
 Benchamat Siriphat and Suraphon Mulada (2002). "En chi o" Nak phatthana radap rak ya 
Phan thi sangkhom khat (mai) dai?. [NGO: the grassroots development workers. Are 
they indispensable to society?], Bangkok: Sathaban chumchon thong thin phatthana. 
Chaturong Bunyaratanasunthon (2000). Khrong kan wichai ruang rabop lae konlakai phua 
kan borihan kan chat kan kong thun phua kan phatthana: Korani suksa kong thun phua 
kan long thun thang sangkhom.[Research project on the system and mechanism of 
managing funds for development: the case of the Social Investment Fund], Bangkok: 
Thai Research Fund Office. 
Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute (CUSRI), Chiang Mai University 
Social Research Institute (CMUSRI), and Khon Kaen University Research and 
Development Institute (KKURDI) (1990). Thamniap ongkon phatthana ekachon 
thai.[Directory of non-governmental organizations], Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University. 
Community Development Department (CDD) (1997). Klum omsap phua kan phalit: kho 
thet ching khomun, kho sananae [Savings groups for production: the facts, data, and 
policy proposal], Bangkok: CDD.  
Community Organization Development Institute (CODI) (2001). Sang khwam khem 
khaeng khong sangkhom chak than rak: Duai phalang ongkon chumchon lae pracha 
sangkhom.[Building a strong society from grassroots by the power of community 
organizations and civil society], Bangkok: CODI. 
-------------------- (2002). Chumchon phatthana kan su khwam khem khaeng: Rai ngan 
pracham pi 2545. [Development for strong community: the annual report of 2002], 
Bangkok: CODI. 
EFORD (Klum laek plian phua ngan phatthana chonnabot) (1985). "Kan phung ton eng lae 
kan sanap sanun ongkon chao ban,"[Self-reliance and promotion of people’s 
organizations], n.p.. 
Kitisak Sinthuwanit and Chaiyong Mongkhonkit-ngam (1984). "Kong thun phatthana 
muban: Mi khwam wang khae nai" [Rural Development Fund: How much potential?], 
Warasan sethakit lae sangkhom, vol.21 no.3: 37-42. 
Kong prasan kan phatthana chonnabot (1997), "Sathaban phatthana ongkon chumchon: 
Sinshua phua kan phattahana chumchon,"[Institutions for community organizations: 
the financing for community development], Warasan sethakit lae sangkhom, vol.34, no.2: 
17-21. 
NESDB (c.1984). Phaen phatthana chonnabot phun thi yakchon pi 2528-2529. [Poverty 
area rural development plan, 1985-86], Bangkok: NESDB.  
NESDB (c.1985). Phon kan phatthana nai raya khrung phaen phatthana chabap thi 5 
(pho.so. 2525-2527).[The results of the Fifth National Development Plan for the first 
three years (1982-84)], Bangkok: NESDB. 
21 
 NESDB (1986), Phaen phatthana chonnabot nai chuang phaen phatthana chabap thi 6 
(2530-2534). [Rural development plan during the Sixth National Development Plan], 
Bangkok: NESDB. 
NESDB (c.1987). Phon kan phatthana tam phaen phatthana sethakit lae sangkhom haeng 
chat chabap thi 5 (pho.so. 2525-2529). [The results of the Fifth National Economic and 
Social Development Plan (1982-86)], Bangkok: NESDB. 
NESDB (1989). Rai ngan phon kan prachum thit thang kan phatthana chonnabot nai 
chuang phaen phatthana chabap thi 7. [Report of the meeting on the direction of rural 
development during the 7th National Development Plan], Bangkok: NESDB. 
NESDB (1996). “Naeo khit lae naeo thang damnoen kan 'prachakhom changwat': Konlakai 
songsoem krabuan kan tham ngan phatthana baep phahu phakhi,"[The idea and 
practice of ‘civil society forum’: a mechanism for promoting development with multi-party 
collaboration], (mimeo) Bangkok: NESDB. 
NESDB (2000). Krop wisaithat lae thit thang phaen phatthana chabap thi 9. [Vision and 
direction of the 9th development plan], Bangkok: NESDB. 
Ongkon klang (Khana kammakan tit tam lae sot song dulae) (1992). Rai ngan chabap 
sombun kan luak tang samachik sapha phu thaen rasadon 22 minakhom 2535. [The final 
report of the general election in March 22, 1992], Bangkok: Ongkon klang. 
Paiboon Watthanasiritham (c.1998). "Kong thun phua kan long thun thang sangkhom 
'kong thun chumchon': bot samphat phiset nai Paiboon Watthanasiritham phuamunuai 
kan thanakhan omsin rong prathan khana kamakan borihan kong thun phua kan long 
thun thang sangkhom" [Social Investment Fund, “the fund of community”: Special 
interview with Paiboon Wattanasiritham, Director of Government Savings Bank and 
Chairman of Social Investment Fund Operation Committee], (mimeo). 
Pimjai Surintaraseree (2001). Local Development Institute/Foundation - Thailand: A Case 
Study. New York: Synergos Institute. 
Pollwatch (Khana kammakan onkon klang kan luak tang) (1992). Thamniap phu prasan 
ngan asa samak (Po O So.). [Volunteer coordinator list], Bangkok: Pollwatch.  
----------- (1994). Rai ngan kan luak tang samachik sapha phu thaen rasadon wan thi 13 
kanyayon 2535. [Report of the General Election of September 13, 1992], Bangkok: 
Pollwatch. 
Praphat Saensing (2000). Khrong kan wichai ruang rabop lae konlakai phua kan borihan 
kan chat kan kong thun phua kan phatthana: Korani suksa samnak ngan phatthana 
chumchon muang.[Research project on the system and mechanism of managing funds for 
development: the case of the Urban Community Development Office], Bangkok: 
Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute. 
Prawes Wasi (1994). Kan phatthana prachathiptai lae kan pathirup thang kan muang. 
22 
 [Development of democracy and political reform], Bangkok: Samnak phim mo chaoban. 
Prudhisan Jumbala (1992). Nation-building and Democratization in Thailand: A Political 
History. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute. 
Phairot Suchinda (1985). "Sarup kan banyai ruang  naeo nom phaen phatthana chabap 
thi 6 nai dan kan phatthana chonnabot," [A summary of a lecture on the vision for the 6th 
rural development plan], in Research and Development Institute (RDI) et al. (ed.), Kan 
prasan ngan rawang rat lae ongkon phatthana ekachon nai phak isan. Korat: RDI et 
al.:14-15. 
Riggs, Fred Warren (1966). Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity. 
Honolulu: East-West Center Press. 
Shigetomi, Shinichi (1998a). Cooperation and Community in Rural Thailand: An 
Organizational Analysis of Participatory Rural Development. Tokyo: Institute of 
Developing Economies. 
---------------- (1998b). “Noson kyodo kumiai no sonritsu joken: Shinyo kyodo soshiki ni miru 
tai to nihon no keiken” [How can rural cooperatives develop beyond the village 
community?: A comparative analysis of Thailand and Japan], in Hiroyoshi Kano (ed.), 
Tonan ajia noson kaihatsu no shutai to soshiki: Nihon tono hikaku, Tokyo: Institute of 
Developing Economies, pp.179-219. 
---------------- (2004). “NGOs as Political Actors in Thailand: Their Development and 
Strategies in the Democratization and Human Rights Movements,” in Shinichi Shigetomi, 
Kasian Tejapira, and Apichart Thongyou (eds.), The NGO Way: Perspectives and 
Experiences from Thailand. Bangkok: Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External 
Trade Organization. 
Social Fund Office (SOFO) 2003. Community and Social Empowerment Movement: Social 
Investment Fund Completion Report (1998-2003). Bangkok: SOFO. 
Thai Volunteer Service (TVS) (1986). Directory of non-government organizations in 
Thailand 1987, Bangkok: TVS. 
Wuthiloet Thewakun et al. (1998). Rai ngan khrong kan suksa lae tit tam pramoen phon 
kan damnoen ngan kong thun phatthana chonnabot phai lang kan damnoen khrong kan 
thot long ruam kan rawang samnak ngan khana kamakan phatthana kan sethakit lae 
sangkhom haeng chat kap thanakhan omsin. [Evaluation report on the Rural 
Development Fund after the test implementation by the National Economic and Social 
Development Board and Government Savings Bank], Bangkok: Kasetsart University. 
 
 
23 
